There is the “song room” (노래방), the “video room” (비디오방), and now the “kiss room” (키스방).

Yes, that’s right – you can pay for a young lady to kiss you in a private room (Korean). Apparently, it’s becoming a popular method for female college students to earn some cash for tuition. Additional services do not seem to be included.

Probably these girls earn their pay – and that’s not just lip service…

Otherwise known as “food.” From BBC News:

North Korean scientists have developed a new kind of noodle that delays feelings of hunger, a Japan-based pro-Pyongyang newspaper has reported.

[…]

They left people feeling fuller longer and represented a technological breakthrough, the newspaper said.

[…]

“When you consume ordinary noodles (made from wheat or corn), you may soon feel your stomach empty. But this soybean noodle delays such a feeling of hunger,” it said on its website.

This story immediately reminded me of “soylent green.” I’m sure North Korea can make a nutritious noodle based on soy, but have doubts about it really being new, and don’t believe for a second that it will be distributed to the population in any meaningful manner. Perhaps a few elites, perhaps not. For now most North Koreans get by on their version of famine bread.

The Combined Forces Command (CFC) Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) exercise is no more; it has been replaced by the Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise, which started on 18 August and ends on 22 August. The change is more than just the name as this year the South Korean military took the lead role as a step towards taking operational control in 2012. This year the exercise is only a week, compared to the usual two weeks.

UFG is not about polishing warfighting skills, but more a test of command, control, and communications functions in wartime conditions, using computer-simulated scenarios of possible contingencies on the peninsula. The goal is to familiarize participants in the processes involved and identify problems, for example with command structures or communications systems. North Korea has declared the exercise a proactive act:

“The Korean People’s Army will not stand idly by as the bellicose forces in the U.S. and the South mount the Ulchi Freedom Guardian as conservative U.S. hard-liners brand us a rogue state again and erase a series of progress made on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula,” the spokesman said.

While the name has changed, North Korea is still faithfully playing its part.

Update: Some text from a 2006 post on the namesake of the exercise…

The South Korean portion of the exercise name, Ulchi, is in honor of a Koguryo general, Ulchi Mundok (을지문덕):

. . . was a noted military leader of early 7th century Goguryeo, one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea. Often numbered among the greatest heroes in Korean military history, he defended Goguryeo against the Sui Chinese.

Mundeok was born in the mid-6th century and died sometime after 618, although the exact date is unknown. At the time of his birth, the kingdom of Goguryeo had grown to a powerful and belligerent empire, constantly warring with its neighbours, Chinese states to its north and west, and its fellow Korean kingdoms Silla and Baekje to its southeast and southwest respectively.

Image from here.

This post is continued from last July, when rumors or Kim Jong-il having heart surgery had (again) brought up the question of who would lead North Korea should he die. That post basically covered dynastic succession and focused on his three legitimate sons, Kim Jong-nam (김정남), Kim Jong-chol (김정철), and Kim Jong-eun (김정운), none of which had a clear advantage. A year later there is no new information to help discern that.

There are basically three other general possibilities should Kim Jong-il die and dynastic succession not occur; 1) group or collective leadership; 2) a senior government official could take charge, or; 3) an outside power could move in to restore order and take control.

Because there is a complete absence of an opposition party or group in-or-outside North Korea, that option is extremely unlikely and so is not considered here.

Group or Collective Leadership

Group or collective leadership by a political or military institution, or some combination thereof is perhaps the most likely scenario. The Korea Workers Party (KWP), National Defense Commission (NDC), or some sort of joint committee formed from both of those organizations and perhaps others, could fill the leadership void after Kim’s death.

I consider this most likely since these leaders a) have a vested interest in maintain the status quo and b) currently understand and run the machinery of the DPRK government, such as it is. It’s also possible such a group would use of Kim Jong-il’s sons as a figure head for legitimacy.

A New Leader

A senior official from a political or military institution could assume control after Kim’s death, perhaps taking the title of Kim’s current position as Chairman of the NDC. Examples include Kim Yong-nam (김영남), the de facto head of state since 1998 (per the DPRK constitution) or Chang Sŏng’taek (장성택), brother-in-law of Kim Jong-il and former KWP official. A general officer could also attempt to assume control.

This is slightly less likely that collective leadership as Kim Jong-il, as far as we know, currently does not allow any one person to accumulate much influence.

Foreign Intervention

Finally, there is the possibility that North Korea elites will be unable to form a cohesive government and that no one person emerges as a leader after Kim Jong-il’s death. The likely result would be chaos and intervention from either the UN command (i.e., the U.S. and South Korea), or China, depending on the specific circumstances at the time and events beforehand.

If it became apparent North Korea was drifting into chaos, it could trigger the U.S. to execute CONPLAN 5029 to secure weapons of mass destruction, perhaps including nuclear weapons, and attempt to restore a semblance of order. Depending on how such a move is carried out, the state of North Korea’s military at that time, and myriad other factors, such an action could go smoothly or trigger fighting with elements of North Korea’s million-plus-man army.

North Korea’s military leadership could also initiate hostilities, which might leader the U.S. and South Korea to execute OPLAN 5027 - basically a second Korean War.

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) would not survive a confrontation with U.S. and ROK forces, but could inflict severe casualties or those forces as well as civilian populations. The ultimate outcome would be reunification under South Korea’s system, which has it’s own set of pit-falls.

If the U.S. is still occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan, and depending in how events unfold, China’s military could be in a better position to occupy North Korea first, restoring order and keeping a buffer zone between its territory and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). This could lead to conflict between China and South Korea, and could draw in the U.S.

Conclusion

The bottom line is that no one knows who the next North Korean leader will be, perhaps or even likely including North Korean leadership. I lead towards group or collective leadership as I see the elite doing whatever they can to retain power.

Such a group may fail, bringing about collapse, war, or both. Or they could take the opportunity to retain control while, finally, adopting drastic reforms without the need to maintain the ridiculous Kim family cult.

We probably don’t have that many years to wait until Kim Jong-il dies. . .

Mike Chinoy, formerly CNN’s senior Asia correspondent, has a new book, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, which attempts to tell the story of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and America’s attempts to stop their program. Chinoy is currently a visiting professor at the Annenberg School of Journalism at the University of Southern California.

I have not purchased his book and do not plan to after listening to his interview on NPR’s “Fresh Air” yesterday. It was the author’s chance to sell me his book, complete with plenty of softballs from the NPR interviewer, but his omission of key details contrary to his point of view (or attempts to unconvincingly speak around them) ensured there will be no sale here.

An argument Chinoy consistently made was that North Korea has nearly always been ready to talk and negotiate, but not so the U.S., perhaps giving those that don’t know better the impression that North Korea is almost amiable and willing to negotiate, if only the U.S. would come to the table. If that were true, and it is not, it assumes that talking could actually achieve something worthwhile, which history has so far shown false.

Chinoy noted that the 1994 Agreed Framework, the product of “talking,” froze plutonium reprocessing successfully; but he failed to mention, at least on the radio, that North Korea started it’s HEU program just a couple of years later, under Clinton (i.e., an administration that dealt with North Korea). Oh he noted the program, or the “acquisition” of “parts” for a program, but could never admit the extreme likelihood of the existence of the program, or mention the fact that it occurred despite all the “talking” that went on.

He also suggested North Korea didn’t admit to the program in October 2002. Tong Kim was there, heard what the North Koreans said in both Korean and English, and disagrees.

As Joshua notes (in a comment at the Marmot’s), the HEU found on the documents was completely skipped over, at least for the portions of the radio interview I heard as I was away from the radio for a few minutes. It seems unlikely it was addressed in a thorough manner since it tends to contradict the other points he was trying to make.

Chinoy also faulted the Bush administration for sometimes acting as if talking to North Korea was to give up something in and of itself. Talking, no. But this also conveniently omits the North Korean pattern of having conditions for talks, which often does mean that getting to the point of talking includes giving up something.

Apparently this interview was part of NPR’s crusade against Bush, Republicans, and conservatives, which has so far every day this week presented blatantly biased interviews, with plenty of softballs and nary a critical word for the interviewees. NPR’s uncritical interviewing is ridiculous.

Like so many other areas with North Korea where conventional wisdoms do not necessarily apply (e.g., any other country likely would have collapsed by now, certainly Western ones), it’s not a given that talking to your enemy is better than not talking to them.

The Sejong Society will host a talk by Kim Dong-su, a North Korean defector who was the Second Secretary of the Permanent Representative of North Korea to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization when he defected to South Korea in 1998. Before his defection, he served in key posts in North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including as Assistant Secretary of the DPRK to Switzerland and Norway, and as the senior official of the UN Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow at South Korea’s Institute of National Security Strategy.

When & Where:

Thursday, August 14, 2008, 6:45 - 8:00 pm

Rome Auditorium
Rome Building, Johns Hopkins SAIS
1619 Massachussetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
(Closest Metro: Dupont Circle)

Be sure to RSVP for the event. Hat-tip to Maj K.

This week I had the humbling (and somewhat mind-numbing) experience of taking the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) for Korean. I’d planned on taking the test later this year as I’ll be in Korea this fall for three weeks to visit family, but circumstances dictated that the test occur sooner; I had to cram and was unprepared.

In the process of trying to get prepared, I found some excellent Korean language study resources, if you’re taking the DLPT or not.

First it dlpt.net, which offers vocabulary quizzes in Korean, English, and even hanja (한자, Korea’s use of Chinese characters). At the end of each quiz you are given your score (percentage) and a list of each word missed with both Korean and English test – very useful.

Korean Listening Practice has 85 Korean audio clips and questions for each clip. This is very similar to the DLPT listening portion of the test. While the clips are somewhat dated, they are still extremely useful.

Finally, the Flash Card Exchange offers flash cards and vocabulary lists for many languages. I suggest creating a free account, searching for “Korean” or “DLPT,” and viewing the flashcards or the many vocabulary lists created by other users, or even uploading your own vocabulary lists.

If you know of any other Korean language study resources, please list them in comments.

This week Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama criticized the Bush administration for not engaging in diplomacy with North Korea between 2002-2005. Said Obama:

“While the United States was refusing to talk with North Korea, the reclusive regime developed eight units of nuclear weapons… North Korea secured nuclear materials (plutonium) that can make eight to 10 nuclear weapons”

While I’ll be the first one to criticize the Bush administration’s current handling of North Korea policy, Obama is leaving off the key contextual half of this story that makes his specific criticism specious.

Obama is partially right, but misses the big picture that matters, particularly in regard to the point he was attempting to convey; North Korea started a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program after it secured the 1994 Agreed Framework from the Clinton administration, and was dealing with Pakistan’s proliferating AQ Khan even as former secretary of state Madeline Albright visited Pyongyang. Clinton was even considering a trip to North Korea.

Basically North Korea was pursing nuclear weapons at what was close to the height of diplomatic relations between the two countries, indicating (once again) that diplomacy and engagement is not a primary factor in Kim Jong-il’s nuclear calculus.

In other words, Obama is wrong about this.

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It’s been just over a year and the first birthday parties - regular and traditional (첫돌) - were last week!

I’ll be very busy and mostly without net access until mid-July.