North Korea’s Nuclear Gamble a Masterstroke
by Richardson ~ October 11th, 2006. Filed under: Arms Race, Axis of Evil, China-Korea Relations, DPRK Military, Economics, Engagement, Geopolitics, Hunger & Famine, Japan-Korea Relations, Kim Jong-il, North Korea, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks, WMD. 
When North Korea’s nuclear test was first reported, I thought the Kim regime should have saved a few steps by conducting the test directly over Pyongyang. I also thought the test went too far for my pet theory of ‘strategic disengagement.’ However, with the first round of reactions in from the major players, I’m reassessing; the nuclear test may actually have accomplished most, if not all, of what Kim Jong-il intended.
The obvious reason for a nuclear program is a given; having the ultimate deterrent. And the obvious reason for a test; one has to know if their ultimate deterrent will work when the time comes. This post addresses the issue of what North Korea was attempting to accomplish in the realm of mid-term stability.
The standard list of what North Korea likely wants (clarification, claims to want or is thought to want, true or not) – the concessions it is said to be trying to extort with the current crisis – is this:
• Bilateral negotiations with the U.S.
• Formal security assurances from the U.S.
• The U.S. military out of Korea
• Diplomatic relations with the U.S. and others
• LWR reactors provided before NPT compliance
• Colonial reparations from Japan
• Food and development aid, investment, etc.
First a brief recap of strategic disengagement: because the Kim regime was built on a foundation of cult mythology and an alternate history, the exposure of the North Korean people to reality is an enormous vulnerability for the regime. Therefore the regime must seek isolation over engagement in order to retain political stability, a concept explained by the ‘J-curve’ theory.
This became apparent to North Korea after the influx of aid after the famines of the mid and late 1990s brought unprecedented foreign contact. In 2002, when the U.S. exposed North Korea’s uranium reprocessing program, the notion of “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization” (CVID) ensured more of the same, prompting a change in strategy from survival by extortion to survival by a more complete isolation, allowing only a limited one-way ‘engagement.’ In this paradigm, collapse by engagement is just as sure as collapse by war, only slower. Why engagement and related information flow is so dangerous to the regime is more fully explained here.
With that in mind, this is how reactions to North Korea’s recent nuclear test fits into ‘strategic disengagement’ and tend to disprove that the DPRK is attempting to extort concessions. This explains the difference between what North Korea says it wants and the actions it takes. As counterintuitive as it may seem at first, by ensuring its own isolation and consolidating internal power and stability with the excuse of a viable external threat:
U.S.: For years North Korea has been demanding that the U.S. leave South Korea, and in recent months a USFK drawdown had become certain a complete withdrawal had become conceivable. Despite this, North Korea took perhaps the only action it could, aside from actually attacking South Korea, which might reverse current USFK plans. In fact, the U.S. has already announced plans to bolster missile defenses in the region.
Given the U.S. response to the North’s 4 July missiles tests, the Kim regime had no expectation that a nuclear test would somehow yield concessions or an agreement to bilateral talks. On the contrary, the Bush administration unambiguously stated that a nuclear test would be seen as a provocation that would be met with sanctions and other negative results, not rewards. Yet North Korea took a step that would virtually guarantee such actions be taken against them, even while states that sanctions would be viewed as an, “act of war” against them and even threatened more nuclear tests.
The U.S., paranoid about nuclear proliferation to terrorist groups – and rightly so – will now watch North Korean territory with an even greater attention than before. North Korean routinely complains about the number of U.S. intelligence collection flights in the region, but took an action that is again probably guaranteed to increase such activity on the part of the U.S.
Finally, if North Korea had hopes of waiting out the Bush administration for a possible Democratic president that would meet them bilaterally and perhaps not be as strict with CVID, they also incinerated that possibility with the nuclear test.
Japan: North Korea has also complained about the threat from Japan, yet their actions once again have given Japan a clear justification for changing its constitution and to initiate a more aggressive rearmament policy. If North Korea were seeking concessions, or the Holy Grail of deals for the impoverished country, colonial reparations somewhere over US$ ten billion, why would they test a nuclear device?
Japan has unilaterally imposed sanctions on North Korea, restricted remittances from Koreans in Japan to Pyongyang – which will hurt North Korea’s elite – and banned all imports from North Korea. Given the warnings Japan issued prior to the test, it is impossible that the Kim regime didn’t grasp what the likely result would be, yet again took an action that would result in sanctions against North Korea.
South Korea: With the nuclear test, North Korea has finally gone far enough to shock South Koreans out of their delusional reunification dream that has gripped the nation since June 2000, when former ROK President Kim Dae-jung met Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang and they produced a joint statement (PDF). Kim Jong-il has done what the GNP could not; he killed the “Sunshine Policy.” The joint venture at Kaesong and tourist trips to Kumgangsan are in jeopardy, cutting off yet another source of income for the regimes elite. If the programs are continued under Roh, his party likely would see even more of a crushing defeat in the next election. What other changes may come, at the very least President Roh will have lost all credibility and support for dealing with North Korea.
Rather than taking steps to secure the items it supposedly wants (security guarantees, diplomatic relations, etc.), North Korea has systematically taken actions that preclude such concessions and ensures isolation. It is my assertion that this is to protect the cult and therefore the regime.
The nuclear test in particular does this by snubbing the U.S., Japan, and South Korea with one fell swoop. At the same time it has set conditions for a new East Asian arms race in which Japan and South Korea expand military spending, with the aid of the U.S. The Kim regime then uses what is sees as the growing military threat against them to help maintain internal stability and to justify the resources the military receives.
The U.S. is overextended in Iraq and in no hurry for any military confrontation, aside from the artillery and missiles that would devastate Seoul. China is concerned about the appearance and actuality of stability before its 2008 Olympic games, and the possible presence of USFK on a reunified PRC-Korean border, so will not threaten North Korea’s stability beyond some token words and a slap on the wrist.
The final outcome is that North Korea will have become a nuclear power, maintained isolation thus preserving the cult and the Kim regime, while not fearing a military reprisal or crippling punishment from China. Humanitarian aid is unlikely to be halted, and China will continue to prop up the regime.
There are some rather drastic actions the U.S. could take to pressure China into action, as well as the rest of the international community, but that is unlikely to occur.
I think Kim Jong-il pulled a fast one, and is getting away with it.
October 12th, 2006 at 12:20 am
Now, the U.S. should do something totally unexpected.
Offer Kim Jong-il a peace treaty, full diplomatic relations, economic investment, and … implicitly … independence from China, at whom the nuclear test was partially aimed.
The North should be much more worried about China than about the U.S. and ought to take the offer.
The reaction would be worth watching…
Jeffery Hodges
* * *
October 12th, 2006 at 12:37 am
KJI does not want negotiations of any kind, or a relationship with the US other than the relationship between an armed robber and his victim. The only things to be discussed in the case of a robbery or “negotiations” with KJI are when the robber/KJI will be receiving everything It (the “midget’s turd” – a self characterization) desires in return for keeping Its word for a little while that “if you (the US) are cool about it (lay down and take it) I won’t hurt you…….much.” Then, when It does not get everything It wants, will say something equivalent to “now I gotta punish yuh fer hold’n out on me an’ not cooperat’n – where yuh wanna be cut?” The explosive device fired recently, whatever its actual character – nuclear or not – is KJI’s new switchblade.
The only approach that is going to work with KJI, because that is all that It understands, is for the intended main victim (the US) and every other potential victim to tell It to go and engage in intercourse with Itself while promising not kill It, but to make everything “hurt real good” if It fails to do so. A scene from one of the Crocodile Dundee movies contains an illustration of the proper technique. Dundee and a lady are confronted by a mugger with a switchblade, which causes Dundee to haul out a very big “real knife” giving the mugger reason to be gone immediately with no loot. Kim deludes himself thinking he is conducting an easy robbery. When he sees clearly that that is not the case and never will be the case, he may give up his continuing criminal enterprise and start behaving. If he fails to see the actual situation clearly, the US (and others) may have to unsheathe and use their “real knives,” which will be ugly but nevertheless necessary.
There is nothing left to be negotiated between the US (or any other country) and North Korea. Negotiations involve give and take (exchange of valuable considerations) by definition. The problem is that KJI and the NKs are all take and no give because they have absolutely nothing to offer. KJI and the NKs want everything their intended victims have in return for no more than an empty promise to engage in a little less criminal activity.
Among the things that KJI specifically wants to take is the self respect of the US and the Republic of Korea through “bilateral negotiations” between NK and the US. Effectively, such “bilateral negotiations” would have the US accepting KJI’s assertion that It is the sole legitimate head of state on the Korean Peninsula and that the Republic of Korea is nothing more than a puppet (no point in “negotiating” with the puppet – speak only to the master). Who in the ROK or the US wants the US to help delegitimize the ROK? There are some, but the ROK actually has laws to deal with them, not as rigorously enforced as they might be, while unfortunately the US is constitutionally as well as politically prevented from having or enforcing a similar law. At this point, passively allowing KJI to succeed in Its continuing criminal enterprise in any way would be worse than morally reprehensible. The six-party gabfest is worse than useless: it is all cost (high) and absolutely guaranteed to result in no benefit.
October 12th, 2006 at 12:50 am
Are you sure that’s on their agenda?
October 12th, 2006 at 5:35 am
All this assumes that the man at the top is a rational and logical person. Every thing that has happened so far does not lead to this conclusion. Therefore the question is really how do you “negotiate” with an almost certifiable lunatic? That I don’t know, and if we are basing our sanctions on what we think that he wants it seems even more difficult to appease him.
As you say China holds the key here. Without the energy and food it supplies NK would almost certainly collapse / implode. Rather than a sudden and dramatic cessation of trade and aid, if a gradual reduction can be started slowly and without him noticing, then eventually the country will grind to a halt. If the aid is still coming in, they cannot complain they are not getting any, if it’s not enough well who’s fault is that? There are other countries in the world far more deserving of aid, why should NK get it? and why cannot NK feed itself?
If more North Koreans can hear the truth about their situation then maybe eventually a revolution, which I guess is unlikely to be peaceful, will overthrow him.
What needs to be done is to start a propaganda campaign in NK somehow so that the citizens know what is happening to their country and why.
October 12th, 2006 at 6:12 am
Mark,
I’m saying that North Korea claims to want the U.S. out of Korea, but having us there provides an added excuse to continue to funnel resources to the military. So it’s my position that the Kim regime actually prefers that USFK not drawdown or withdrawal.
October 12th, 2006 at 6:23 am
Jon,
I have to disagree about Kim Jong-il (follow link to related post). I don’t think he is insane, but probably a sociopath.
The reason negotiations are essentially futile is that North Korea doesn’t want to give up what it has, and can’t really accept what it says it wants because of the need for isolation. Hence what we’ve seen since 1993.
So they will come to the table and even make deals, but they won’t keep them, especially when it comes to actually giving up their programs (CVID). The 1994 Agreed Framework worked well for them in this regard since they got much for little, and could go back on the deal at any time - and did.
I think aid, especially food aid, will continue for the simple reason that the North Korean people are essentially powerless to do anything at this point.
Finally, yes, getting information into North Korea is the other way, aside from China. Some cracks are already showing in the regime, but it is also a very slow method.
October 12th, 2006 at 10:39 am
I was surprised to read yesterday that our stalwart allies in Australia will be continuing their A$4M a year aid program to the North, despite this provocation. Doesn’t bode well for pressuring less friendly governments to likewise strangle the KFR.
October 12th, 2006 at 2:59 pm
I wasn’t surprised to see the PRC stand up and say “We don’t want North Korea punished…” (for their apparent nuclear test). China reminds me of a bad parent. Their children are horrible monsters yet they continue to believe that if they just appease them or take away their Playstations for an hour, that will somehow get them to change their ways. Russia isn’t much better (given their same reactions in both Iraq and the DRPK). Neither of these countries understand the firm hand policy (which, particularly in Russia’s case is odd given their Stalinist history). Children respond to fear of punishment. Fear of a spanking is a better deterent than the actual act of spanking is a punishment. If the DPRK was militarily lit up, meaning precision strikes on everything in that country that has military implications, Kim Jong Il would have nothing left to bargain with. Given the then weak status of his military, chances are a revolution would begin. Maybe the forces of freedom within the DPRK could get a foothold on taking their country back from that midget of a monster.
My particular theory on why China and Russia coddle these countries horrible leaders are not based in the commonly held belief of “it’s worth money to them”. I think China and Russia both hate the U.S. and Great Britain. They loathe them, in fact. I think that just as the U.S. defeated Russia in the Cold War using economics, rather than weapons, Russia, with China’s help intends to regain their superpower status over the U.S. using these rogue regimes as a way to bog the U.S. down and evenutally into submission. If they support these crazy leaders in their ill-fated destinies, they can force the U.S. into a situation where we are spending billions in fighting too many people at once and have a military spread so thin it can’t possible react to an altercation with both China and Russia. Even the U.S., with Britain and Austrailia’s help can’t really match up against both Russia and China combined. The U.S. doesn’t man a big enough army or navy to fight them simultaneously. Look at the result of Germany taking on multiple foes in both World Wars. Germany could not keep up with the military production of the U.S. and others. They could not fund the war through to completion. They lost. The U.S. might have the same fate if what I think is going on really is.
Who does this current round of tensions serve most? Not Kim Jong Il. He won’t gain anything from this but further sanctions and international condemnation. Now if he had someone very big standing behind him…like say Russia and China, wouldn’t he act more emboldened? If he knew somehting we didn’t, such as both China and Russia’s intent to knock the U.S. off their high horse…makes you wonder.
October 12th, 2006 at 4:32 pm
OK, perhaps insane is too strong after some of the descriptions you quote, but sociopath does not seem strong enough!
I am sure food aid will continue too, my only hope is that China will reduce it slowly, maybe one hard winter and the peasants will revolt.
About getting information into North Korea, I wonder if there are any South Korean spies in NK that are able to spread information, does anyone know if there is an “underground resistance” type movement already ?
Or are they all completely brainwashed ?
August 31st, 2007 at 5:49 pm
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